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Paris 1919:
Six Months that Changed the World |

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Paris
1919: Six Months that Changed the World
by Margaret Macmillan
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Book
Description
National
Bestseller
New
York Times Editors’ Choice
Winner
of the PEN Hessell Tiltman Prize
Winner
of the Duff Cooper Prize
Silver
Medalist for the Arthur Ross Book Award
of the Council on Foreign Relations
Finalist
for the Robert F. Kennedy Book Award
For
six months in 1919, after the end of “the
war to end all wars,” the Big Three—President
Woodrow Wilson, British prime minister David
Lloyd George, and French premier Georges Clemenceau—met
in Paris to shape a lasting peace. In this landmark
work of narrative history, Margaret MacMillan
gives a dramatic and intimate view of those
fateful days, which saw new political entities—Iraq,
Yugoslavia, and Palestine, among them—born
out of the ruins of bankrupt empires, and the
borders of the modern world redrawn.
About
the Author
Margaret
MacMillan received her Ph.D. from Oxford University
and is provost of Trinity College and professor
of history at the University of Toronto. Her
previous books include Women of the Raj and
Canada and NATO. Published as Peacemakers in
England, Paris 1919 was a bestseller chosen
by Roy Jenkins as his favorite book of the year.
It won the Samuel Johnson Prize, the PEN Hessell
Tiltman Prize, and the Duff Cooper Prize and
was a finalist for the Westminster Medal in
Military Literature. MacMillan, the great-granddaughter
of David Lloyd George, lives in Toronto.
From
the Back Cover
“The history of the 1919 Paris peace talks
following World War I is a blueprint of the
political and social upheavals bedeviling the
planet now. . . . A wealth of colorful detail
and a concentration on the strange characters
many of these statesmen were keep [MacMillan’s]
narrative lively.”
—The New York Times Book Review
“MacMillan’s
book reminds us of the main lesson learned at
such a high cost in Paris in 1919: Peace is
not something that can be imposed at the conference
table. It can grow only from the hearts of people.”
—Los Angeles Times
“Beautifully
written, full of judgment and wisdom, Paris
1919 is a pleasure to read and vibrates with
the passions of the early twentieth century
and of ours.”
—San Francisco Chronicle
“MacMillan
is a superb writer who can bring history to
life.”
—The Philadelphia Inquirer
“For
anyone interested in knowing how historic mistakes
can morph into later historic problems, this
brilliant book is a must-read.”
—Chicago Tribune
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| Editorial
Reviews
From
Publishers Weekly
A joke circulating in Paris early in 1919
held that the peacemaking Council of Four,
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representing
Britain, France, the U.S. and Italy, was
busy preparing a "just and lasting
war." Six months of parleying concluded
on June 28 with Germany's coerced agreement
to a treaty no Allied statesman had fully
read, according to MacMillan, a history
professor at the University of Toronto,
in this vivid account. Although President
Wilson had insisted on a League of Nations,
even his own Senate would vote the league
down and refuse the treaty. As a rush
to make expedient settlements replaced
initial negotiating inertia, appeals by
many nationalities for Wilsonian self-determination
would be overwhelmed by rhetoric justifying
national avarice. The Italians, who hadn't
won a battle, and the French, who'd been
saved from catastrophe, were the greediest,
says MacMillan; the Japanese plucked Pacific
islands that had been German and a colony
in China known for German beer. The austere
and unlikable Wilson got nothing; returning
home, he suffered a debilitating stroke.
The council's other members horse-traded
for spoils, as did Greece, Poland and
the new Yugoslavia. There was, Wilson
declared, "disgust with the old order
of things," but in most decisions
the old order in fact prevailed, and corrosive
problems, like Bolshevism, were shelved.
Hitler would blame Versailles for more
ills than it created, but the signatories
often could not enforce their writ. MacMillan's
lucid prose brings her participants to
colorful and quotable life, and the grand
sweep of her narrative encompasses all
the continents the peacemakers vainly
carved up. 16 pages of photos, maps.
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information,
Inc.
From
Library Journal
In an ambitious narrative, MacMillan (history,
University of Toronto) seeks to recover
the original intent, constraints, and
goals of the diplomats who sat down to
hammer out a peace treaty in the aftermath
of the Great War. In particular, she focuses
on the "Big Three" Wilson (United
States), Lloyd George (Great Britain),
and Clemenceau (France) who dominated
the critical first six months of the Paris
Peace Conference. Viewing events through
such a narrow lens can reduce diplomacy
to the parochial concerns of individuals.
But instead of falling into this trap,
MacMillan uses the Big Three as a starting
point for analyzing the agendas of the
multitude of individuals who came to Versailles
to achieve their largely nationalist aspirations.
Following her analysis of the forces at
work in Europe, MacMillan takes the reader
on a tour de force of the postwar battlefields
of Asia and the Middle East. Of particular
interest is her sympathy for those who
tried to make the postwar world more peaceful.
Although their lofty ambitions fell prey
to the passions of nationalism, this should
not detract from their efforts. This book
will help rehabilitate the peacemakers
of 1919 and is recommended for all libraries.
Frederic Krome, Jacob Rader Marcus Ctr.
of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information,
Inc.
From
Booklist
Virtually all historians agree that the
Versailles Peace Conference was a monumental
failure that set the stage for the outbreak
of World War II. However, there is no
consensus regarding the causes of that
failure. Some blame Woodrow Wilson and
his high-minded but absurdly impractical
ideals; others blame the cynicism and
narrow nationalism of Lloyd George and
Clemenceau. MacMillan is a professor of
history at the University of Toronto and
the great-granddaughter of Lloyd George.
Her narrative and analysis of the critical
first six months of the negotiations will
not end the controversy. However, this
engrossing and inevitably depressing account
is a vital contribution to efforts at
understanding the deeply flawed agreements
that emerged. At times, MacMillan's recounting
of the minutiae of negotiations can be
overwhelming, but the great accomplishments
of this work are her perceptive and eloquent
depictions of the key players in the conference.
Of course, Wilson, as the dominant force,
is at the center of her account, and she
convincingly tarnishes his image as a
great statesman. He was often insufferably
rigid and arrogant, and his espousal of
frustratingly vague concepts like "self-determination"
often confused even his own advisors.
For those who seek a deeper understanding
of one of history's most tragic failures,
this book is a treasure. Jay Freeman
Copyright © American Library Association.
All rights reserved.
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Excerpt
from Chapter 1 - copyrighted
material
On
december 4, 1918, the George Washington sailed
out of New York with the American delegation
to the Peace Conference on board. Guns fired
salutes, crowds along the waterfront cheered,
tugboats hooted and Army planes and dirigibles
circled overhead. Robert Lansing, the American
secretary of state, released carrier pigeons
with messages to his relatives about his deep
hope for a lasting peace. The ship, a former
German passenger liner, slid out past the Statue
of Liberty to the Atlantic, where an escort
of destroyers and battleships stood by to accompany
it and its cargo of heavy expectations to Europe.
On board were the best available experts, combed
out of the universities and the government;
crates of reference materials and special studies;
the French and Italian ambassadors to the United
States; and Woodrow Wilson. No other American
president had ever gone to Europe while in office.
His opponents accused him of breaking the Constitution;
even his supporters felt he might be unwise.
Would he lose his great moral authority by getting
down to the hurly-burly of negotiations? Wilson's
own view was clear: the making of the peace
was as important as the winning of the war.
He owed it to the peoples of Europe, who were
crying out for a better world. He owed it to
the American servicemen. "It is now my
duty," he told a pensive Congress just
before he left, "to play my full part in
making good what they gave their life's blood
to obtain." A British diplomat was more
cynical; Wilson, he said, was drawn to Paris
"as a debutante is entranced by the prospect
of her first ball."
Wilson
expected, he wrote to his great friend Edward
House, who was already in Europe, that he would
stay only to arrange the main outlines of the
peace settlements. It was not likely that he
would remain for the formal Peace Conference
with the enemy. He was wrong. The preliminary
conference turned, without anyone's intending
it, into the final one, and Wilson stayed for
most of the crucial six months between January
and June 1919. The question of whether or not
he should have gone to Paris, which exercised
so many of his contemporaries, now seems unimportant.
From Franklin Roosevelt at Yalta to Jimmy Carter
or Bill Clinton at Camp David, American presidents
have sat down to draw borders and hammer out
peace agreements. Wilson had set the conditions
for the armistices which ended the Great War.
Why should he not make the peace as well?
Although
he had not started out in 1912 as a foreign
policy president, circumstances and his own
progressive political principles had drawn him
outward. Like many of his compatriots, he had
come to see the Great War as a struggle between
the forces of democracy, however imperfectly
represented by Britain and France, and those
of reaction and militarism, represented all
too well by Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany's
sack of Belgium, its unrestricted submarine
warfare and its audacity in attempting to entice
Mexico into waging war on the United States
had pushed Wilson and American public opinion
toward the Allies. When Russia had a democratic
revolution in February 1917, one of the last
reservations that the Allies included an autocracy
vanished. Although he had campaigned in 1916
on a platform of keeping the country neutral,
Wilson brought the United States into the war
in April 1917. He was convinced that he was
doing the right thing. This was important to
the son of a Presbyterian minister, who shared
his father's deep religious conviction, if not
his calling.
Wilson
was born in Virginia in 1856, just before the
Civil War. Although he remained a Southerner
in some ways all his life - in his insistence
on honor and his paternalistic attitudes toward
women and blacks he also accepted the war's
outcome. Abraham Lincoln was one of his great
heroes, along with Edmund Burke and William
Gladstone. The young Wilson was at once highly
idealistic and intensely ambitious. After four
very happy years at Princeton and an unhappy
stint as a lawyer, he found his first career
in teaching and writing. By 1890 he was back
at Princeton, a star member of the faculty.
In 1902 he became its president, supported virtually
unanimously by the trustees, faculty and students.
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